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Human rights and the rule of law in Tunisia: the slide continues

Since the coup de force by the President Kais Saied on 25 July 2021, the political crisis in Tunisia has only deepened: threats against freedom of expression, weakening of civil society, harassment of human rights defenders, blatant interference by the executive in judicial proceedings, instrumentalisation of the latter with a view to putting an end to political pluralism and the implementation of several initiatives – taken unilaterally as part of exceptional measures – further distort the democratic process. 

The authoritarian regime of President Kais Saied has devolved into a paranoia, hitherto only verbal, transmitted by the latter during numerous public discourses. The increase in arrests, the muzzling of the opposition, the shrinking space for civil society and the introduction of laws prohibiting any criticism raise fears for the worst for Tunisia. 

EuroMed Rights is appalled by this abandonment of respect for the rule of law and human rights.  

We strongly and unequivocally condemn the repression of all forms of dissent and underline our concern about the deterioration of the human rights situation and the rule of law in Tunisia since the coup of 25 July 2021. 

We call for the immediate and unconditional release of lawyers, political staff, journalists and activists arbitrarily detained for their activities in defence of fundamental freedoms.   

We call on the international community to support independent civil society in Tunisia that peacefully and resolutely opposes the erosion of democracy and the rule of law in Tunisia. 

Finally, we call for any cooperation with Tunisia to be conditioned on the respect for human rights and the rule of law. This includes the financial and logistical support of the European Union but also the negotiations of trade agreements, support policies of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank and any other financial institution in which the European Union and/or its Member States have a voice. 

The democratic world cannot remain a spectator in the face of the eradication of the social and political progress made in Tunisia since the 2011 Revolution. 

The note below aims to summarise the deterioration of the situation since the coup of President Kais Saied on July 25, 2021. Albeit non-exhaustive, the note testifies to the worrying authoritarianism of President Saied and the risks for the future of democracy in Tunisia. 

  1. Interference of the executive in the judiciary  

Under the pretext of fighting corruption and widespread injustice, the president has increased his interference with the judiciary in order to influence and extinguish any resistance. In his speech of 25 July 2021, the president gave himself the powers of the public prosecutor and the authority to head the public prosecutor’s office. Although he later renounced his statement in the face of multiple protests from civil society and political actors, the facts tell a different story.  

By publishing, on February 12, 2022, Decree No.11 which dissolves the elected council and appoints a provisional council of the judiciary, Kais Saied proclaimed himself ‘de facto head’ of the judicial authority. These powers have allowed the president to arbitrarily dismiss 57 judges on such vague charges as ‘obstructing terrorism-related investigations’, ‘moral corruption’, ‘adultery’, and organising ‘alcoholic parties’. And this without any respect for the rights of the defence and rules relating to the disciplinary process. 

Despite an administrative court decision of 10 August 2022 reinstating a significant number of these judges, the government has refused to comply. The Ministry of Justice continues to undermine the independence of judges by instituting criminal proceedings before the counter-terrorism unit against thirteen (13) beneficiaries of this judicial decision. These prosecutions represent a dangerous manipulation of the procedures, laws and principles of a fair trial. They also confirm what the exemption decisions had pointed out: these revocations were not based on any judicial record or tangible evidence of serious misconduct.

2.  To this day, harassment and threats continue against judges in Tunisia. A justice system instrumentalised to silence any critical voice  

In order to silence any opposition, the executive has instrumentalised the justice system in an unprecedented way since July 25, 2021.  

Civilians are brought before military courts, as is the case for lawyer Mehdi Zagrouba. Targeted by an investigation following a Facebook post in which he accused Tunisian minister of justice Leila Jaffel of fabricating court documents, he was sentenced on 20 January 2023 to 11 months in prison with immediate effect and barred for five years from practising law by the military court of appeal.   

And on January 4, 2023, the prosecutor’s office announced the prosecution of 16 trade unionists of the transport union due to their participation in a sit-in on January 2 at the Kasbah. 

3. Political pluralism silenced 

This veritable witch hunt has culminated in an arrest in an alleged case of “conspiracy against the internal and external security of the state” of eight Tunisian opposition leaders as well as the director of a private radio station between February 11 and 24, 2023: 

  • Khayam Turki, founder of the think tank “Joussour”, former member of the Tunisian opposition party Etakattol and founding member of the Jomhouri party, but also known as a lawyer and human rights defender;  
  • Issam Chebbi, long-time opponent and secretary-general of Jumhouri; 
  • Jaouhar Ben Mbarek, political activist and leader of the National Salvation Front 
  • Chaima Issa, an activist with the National Salvation Front, Tunisia’s first female political prisoner since the 2011 revolution; 
  • Abdelhamid Jelassi, a former leader of the Islamist Ennahda party; 
  • Lazhar Akermi, lawyer, political activist and former minister; 
  • Ridha Belhaj, an important member of the National Salvation Front;  
  • Ghazi Chaouachi, former secretary-general of the opposition party ‘Le Courant démocrate’ [The Democratic Current]. 

These arrests were preceded by those of:

  • Nourredine Bhiri, former Minister of Justice from 2011 to 2013 and leader of the Ennahda party, imprisoned and also charged with conspiracy against state security after being placed under house arrest for two months before being released without charge, 
  • Nourredine Boutar, director of Mosaic FM radio, arrested on February 13, facing charges of money laundering and ‘illicit enrichment’. 

Prosecuted for conspiracy against the security of the state, on the basis of the criminal code and the anti-terrorism and anti-money-laundering act, several detainees face the death penalty. The minutes of the interrogations published on Tunisian social media show that the prosecutions are based on testimonies from unknown sources and do not relate to any facts, but to public statements antithetical to the regime or regarding the editorial line of Mosaique FM radio. To date, the public prosecutor’s office has not yet commented on these prosecutions and arrests of opponents, trade unionists or the director of the Mosaique FM radio. These politically motivated prosecutions have a single objective: to eliminate and silence opposition parties, critical voices and any political initiative that would aim to bring Tunisia out of the crisis it has been in since July 25, 2021.   

The examples of executive and presidential interference in judicial matters were further illustrated on 14 February when, in a televised address, Kais Saied called those who were arrested (without naming them) “traitors” and “terrorists” even though they were not formally charged with “conspiracy against the internal and external security of the state”, adding on 22 February that “those who would exonerate them are their accomplices.”  

The latest example of a worrying escalation: the arrest, interrogation and placement under a committal order [remand in custody awaiting trial or further legal proceedings] of the leader of the Islamist party Ennahda and former speaker of Parliament, dissolved in July 2021, Rached Ghannouchi. In contrast with the charges brought against certain opposition members. Rached Ghannouchi is not being prosecuted for a terrorist act but for statements in which he had claimed that Tunisia’s plan to exclude left-wing parties or those from political Islam such as Ennahda would “lead to a civil war”. 

The arrest of Rached Ghannouchi follows a series of travel bans and appearances before the anti-terrorism judicial body, and represents just another step in the ongoing repression process in Tunisia. This is evidenced by the ban on activities of the Ennahda movement and the National Salvation Front by the Ministry of the Interior on April 18, 2023. 

4. A distorted electoral process 

Since July 25, the President of the Republic has taken a series of initiatives, unilaterally, through which he has distorted the will of the citizens. Some examples include: 

  • The national consultation: 
  • Launched on January 15, 2022, it ended on March 20. At less than 6%, turnout was very low; 
  • Mobilisation of state resources for a personal project (the state has deployed all means to stimulate the participation of citizens); 
  • The non-inclusivity of the platform (not accessible by all, not reliable and not secure, thus offering the possibility of ‘voting’ several times). 
  • Constitutional referendum and takeover of the Independent High Authority for Elections (Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Élections – ISIE): 
  • Control over the ISIE by amending the organic law through a decree-law published on 22 April 2022 which entrusts the president of the republic with the appointment of the members of the council, as well as the president and spokesman of the authority; 
  • Criticism against the referendum campaign because of the delays in registration before the publication of the draft constitution but also because of the prohibition to register for the referendum campaign for those who boycott the referendum; 
  • The referendum recorded the lowest rate among all ballots since 2011 with only a 30.5% turnout. 
  • The parliamentary elections 
  • Tunisia’s parliamentary elections saw a historically low turnout of 11.22%, from 41.70% in 2019 (world record for abstention in an election). The rejection by the political class, the calls for boycotts by the main parties and the lack of interest in an assembly with considerably restricted powers have led to a massive disaffection of voters, who are more concerned about the economic conditions that affect the country. In the first round, 23 candidates were elected, 10 of them automatically in the absence of opponents. Of the ten seats reserved for the diaspora, only three were filled, the remaining seven remaining vacant in the absence of candidates in the constituencies. 

5. Violations of freedom of expression and threats to media freedom 

Article 24 of Decree-Law No. 2022-54 of 13 September 2022, relating to the fight against offences relating to information and communication systems, punishes with 5 years in prison and a fine of fifty thousand dinars anyone who “knowingly uses information and communication systems and networks to produce, spread, disseminate, or send, or write false news, false data, rumours, false or falsified documents or falsely attributed to others for the purpose of harming the rights of others or harming public security or national defense or sowing terror among the populationor to “disseminate false or falsified news or documents or information containing personal data, or attribution of unfounded data aimed at defaming others, damaging their reputation, financially or morally harming them, inciting attacks against them or inciting hate speech”. The foreseen penalties are doubled “if the person concerned is a public official or equivalent“. 

The text does not give any definition of “fake news” and “rumour”, thus leaving a significant margin of interpretation to security services and judges. Investigations conducted on this basis point to new threats to freedom of expression. 

Since the implementation of Decree 54, the authority responsible for its enforcement did not hesitate to intimidate voices opposing the policies of the government or the president of the Republic. Whether it’s calling for protests, publishing a press article, or providing a legal or political interpretation, the current authority, primarily in the hands of the ‘keeper of the seals’ [minister of justice], is quick to use Article 24 of Decree 54 to prosecute and arrest anyone who criticises what is happening in Tunisia. 

On October 28, 2022, police arrested student Ahmed Hamada for three days for publishing videos of a demonstration in Tunis’s popular Hay Tadhamoun district, where clashes between police and protesters had taken place. 

On November 14, 2022, Business News editor Nizar Bahloul was prosecuted for an article criticising Prime Minister Najla Bouden. 

To date still, dozens of human rights activists, journalists, writers, lawyers and citizens are being prosecuted in light of Decree 54. For example, the human rights activist, coordinator of the Committee for the defence of exempt judges and head of the national commission for the defence of freedoms and democracy, lawyer Ayachi Al-Hamami, journalist of the daily ‘Assabah’ Monia Arfaoui, and journalist Mohamed Boughalleb.  

More recently, journalists Haythem ElMekki and Elyes Gharbi were brought before the court because of Law 54 following an episode of their programme “Midi Show” on 15 May. They are still at liberty but risk a prison sentence.  

6. Weakened civil society and harassed human rights activists  

There are worrying signs that, under President Saied, the authorities could take steps to further restrict the ability of Tunisian and international civil society organisations to operate freely in Tunisia. Specifically, a leaked bill would give the authorities significant powers to decide on the existence of these groups and to control their activities. It would reinstate the requirement for civil society organisations to obtain state authorisation to operate and would subject foreign funding to prior approval by the Tunisian central bank. The bill would also stipulate that activities and documents published by the groups must meet vague requirements of “integrity”, “professionalism” and cannot “threaten the unity of the state”. Finally, it would allow the authorities to summarily dissolve groups that remain inactive beyond a certain period of time.  

In addition to regulatory and legislative threats, harassment and intimidation of activists and defenders continues to grow. To this end, the president of the National Union of Tunisian Journalists, Mahdi Jlassi, is the subject of a judicial investigation against him for “inciting disobedience and assaulting a public official” because he followed for his media channel a demonstration against the referendum on the new Tunisian constitution on July 18, 2022 in Tunis. The same thing happened to the President of the Tunisian League for Human Rights, Bassem Trifi, who was summoned to appear, on 28 April 2023, before the special investigation brigade for terrorist crimes.