10/12/2025 — 10/03/2026 

  • 10th of March 2026: Right-wing bloc advances stricter EU deportation rules: The European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE) approved a new return regulation 41–32 (1 abstention) after the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) joined far-right groups including ECR. The proposal could allow detention of migrants, including families and minors, for up to two years, expand data surveillance and enforcement measures, and pave the way for offshore deportation centres, prompting warnings from rights groups of a major shift toward harsher EU migration enforcement. 
  • On the 10th of February 2026, the European Parliament approved major amendments to its Asylum Procedure Regulations, broadening the “safe third country” concept and permitting the creation of a “safe country of origin” at EU level. As Euronews explains, the two votes split the coalition that supports Ursula Von Der Leyen’s Commission, with the EPP allying with the far right against the Socialists and Liberals. The “safe third country” reform removes the requirement of a link between the asylum seeker and the country of transfer. Applicants awaiting an appeals decision can now be deported to non-EU countries. This allows Member States to send people to countries to which they have never been, provided that a prior arrangement is in place and that the country is deemed “safe”. Furthermore, if a person challenges a decision of inadmissibility based on the application of the concept of “safe third country,” their appeal will no longer automatically suspend the decision. They may therefore be deported to the non-EU country during the appeal process. The Parliament further adopted a list of “safe countries of origin,” including Bangladesh, Tunisia, Morocco, Kosovo, Colombia, Egypt, and India. Anyone who is a national of these countries will be subject to an accelerated asylum application procedure.  
  • In an article published on January 30th, 2026, Euobserver questions the possibility of creating a new form of solidarity: that of return. The article refers to the European solidarity system that should allow for a better distribution of asylum applications between Member States of first reception, such as Greece and Italy, and second-line countries, such as Germany or France. The article mentions a project of the European Commission dating from 2020 to create relocation to deport the people under a return decision. This would concern people under a return decision, and the Member State that would have an agreement or privileged links with the person’s country of origin. The Member State in question would therefore take charge of nationals of specific countries, to ensure their return. This procedure may be revived in March with the publication of the proposal for a regulation on asylum measures by the European Commission. 
  • The EU plans to fund €3 million for the creation of a Mediterranean rescue centre in Benghazi, in eastern Libya, according to an article published on the 29th of January 2026 by Infomigrant. This rescue centre would have the same objectives as the one in Tripoli (established in 2017), that is to intercept migrants at sea and return them to the Libyan coast where people are regularly subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. There are further concerns about who could benefit from this centre. For instance, in eastern Libya, the Tariq-Ben-Zeyad militia, active in this area of the country, could be chosen as a reference group for the management of the centre. However, this same militia is suspected of being responsible for the armed attack on the Ocean Viking in October 2025. 
  • The European Commission’s new visa and migration strategy was unveiled on the 29th of January 2026. According to Politico, the migration strategy will be based on cooperation with non-EU states, strengthening European borders, implementing the Pact on Migration and Asylum (an effective return policy), and talent mobility. The visa roadmap unveiled by the European Commission proposes enhanced control of visa-free regimes and the creation of a new category of restrictive measures to strengthen visa diplomacy. For example, States that are not cooperative in terms of re-admission will be sanctioned with a suspension on delivery of visas or an increase in visa costs. Additionally, the Commission would like to prioritise visa procedures for ‘high value-added’ people, as well as to create a visa support office within Frontex to facilitate training and document verification. 
  • The European Migration Network published a briefing note on the 27th of January 2026 which analyses and compares the asylum border procedures currently applied by Member States prior to the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum. Currently twelve Member States apply accelerated border procedures and thirteen do not. The information note shows differences in procedures, deadlines, and the understanding of people’s vulnerability. 
  • On the 26th of January 2026, 16 UN independent rapporteurs issued a report on the proposed “return” regulation. Concerns mainly relate to possible violations of international law, including the principle of non-refoulement and the weakening of procedural safeguards. Other points of concern include the extension of the grounds for detention, the obligation of cooperation of migrants or the creation of “return centres”. 
  • On the 26th of January 2026, Johannes Luchner, Deputy Director-General of the European Commission’s Home Affairs Division, said: “We would like to reduce the number of these necessary returns by increasing the number of people prevented from using an irregular route”. This declaration reflects recent legislative advancements regarding “safe third countries” and “safe countries of origin.” According to Mr Luchner, the re-admission agreements are very expensive and are “the last step in a failed process”. Nevertheless, the EU continues to move forward by signing non-binding re-admission agreements such as those with Afghanistan, Guinea, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, The Gambia, and Côte d’Ivoire. According to Euobserver, the EU has signed 18 re-admission agreements out of a possible 25. 
  • According to Euobserver published on the 23rd of January 2026, the negotiations in the European Parliament on the proposal for the ‘return’ regulation, which began on the 12th of January, are moving towards an alliance between the centre and the far right. The main negotiator of the liberal political group Renew Europe, Malik Azmani MEP, is said to have accepted far-right amendments weakening the guarantees allowing asylum seekers to challenge deportation orders. According to the media’s sources, he would have passed amendments from the far-right group Europe of Sovereign Nations without qualifying them from this group. 
  • The three EU Member States that carried out the most deportations between July and September 2025 are Germany, France and Cyprus, Politico revealed on January 22, 2026. Under the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the EU, interior ministers met in Nicosia to discuss the Return Regulation. On the sidelines of this meeting, an event on January 22nd, 2026, chaired by the German Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt. The informal meeting brought together the interior ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Greece, as well as Commissioner Brunner. The aim was to launch negotiations on the creation of “return centres” outside Europe. 
  • On the 15th of January, Frontex published the annual data for 2025 on irregular crossings recorded at the EU’s external borders by the agency. In 2025, there was a 26% drop compared to the previous year. However, as the doctoral student in geography Camille Martel points out to the media Ouest France, the data produced are detections, it is possible that a person is counted several times, thus making the figures less relevant. 
  • On the 12th of January 2026, the Euobserver published an article about failures in Member States’ resettlement and relocation commitments, demonstrating a tightening of migration policies. Resettlement concerns people who have been recognised as refugees by the UN in countries outside the EU. Eighteen Member States, including Germany, refuse to commit to resettlement quotas. The Member States have only committed 10,430 places for 2026-2027, a drop of 83% compared to 2024-2025. Germany, which had promised 13,000 places in 2024, is now offering nothing. Relocations consist of taking charge of the examination of asylum applications from Member States “under pressure”. The European Commission was aiming for 21,000 relocations but only obtained 9,000 commitments. Hungary and Slovakia having promised nothing, are going against the system of solidarity wanted by the Commission.   
  • The Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council visited Damascus on the 8th of January to announce €620 million in aid to Syria to help restore necessary services. This aid has a specific objective, as Antonio Costa, President of the European Council, declared on the 13th of January: “It will also help to create more favourable conditions for the voluntary return of the very large number of Syrians who have been forced to leave the country.” These words, collected by Euobserver, show the EU’s willingness to assist in the return of Syrian people. ‘Voluntary’ departures have already started in Cyprus (1400 Syrians) and Germany (300 Syrians) between July and September 2025. However, the ‘voluntary’ returns from Cyprus are described by civil society organisations as “coercion by misery” in reference to the precarious conditions of the people on the island and the €1,500 allocated to people who agree to leave. 
  • The European Parliament and the Council of the EU reached an agreement on the 18th of December 2025 to modernise the rules on “safe third countries” in the field of asylum. In a press release issued by the LIBE committee, the new provisions for the application of the concept were detailed. Member States will now be able to declare an asylum application inadmissible and deport the applicant to a “safe third country” in three cases: if there is a link between a person and the country (such as family, previous stay, cultural ties). Secondly, if they have transited through the country where they could have applied for protection. Thirdly, if an agreement exists between the Member State and a non-EU country for the admission of asylum seekers. Unaccompanied minors are exempt from the last provision. The disappearance of the connection link between the applicant and the country concerned in the last provision is a novelty. In addition, if the applicant lodges an appeal against the inadmissibility of their application, they will no longer be able to remain in the EU while it is being examined. The suspensive effect of the appeal is therefore no longer applied. The agreement still needs to be formally adopted in Parliament before entering into force. 
  • On the 18th of December 2025, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU issued two major judgments reversing the decisions of the General Tribunal in the cases of WS and Others v. Frontex and Hamoudi v. Frontex. On January 6th, 2026, the European law website published an article on the scope of these judgments.  These decisions mark a turning point by explicitly recognising the vulnerability of asylum seekers and adapting the legal rules to this reality. These two decisions strengthen Frontex’s legal responsibility in pushback operations. Both cases have been sent to the General Tribunal for reconsideration. 
  • On the 16th of December 2025, a joint letter from some EU ministers was sent to the European Commission urging it to strengthen cooperation with non-EU states. The letter was signed by the interior and foreign ministers of 15 EU countries: Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Austria, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Malta, Estonia, Lithuania, and Denmark. Three key points necessary for the externalisation of EU migration policies were highlighted. Firstly, the need to consider ‘innovative solutions’ in the future ‘multiannual financial framework’. Secondly, the importance of reforming European agencies such as Frontex or the asylum agency in order to “provide effective support” in the implementation of these new “solutions”. Thirdly, a joint ‘diplomatic action’ bringing together the European Commission, the Member States and the EU’s diplomatic service to negotiate new partnerships with non-EU States.  
  • Statewatch published an internal document dated on the 7th of November 2025, sent by the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU, on the creation of “innovative solutions” at the European level. The aim of the document is to propose a new form of arrangements with non-EU countries to limit crossings in the Mediterranean. The proposed arrangement would be called “places of safety” and would consist of outsourcing all the responsibilities incumbent on the European Member States of first reception. In this “innovative solution”, people intercepted in the Mediterranean would be obliged to disembark in a non-EU country and would have to apply for international protection in that country or in another non-EU country that would be part of the arrangement and would be responsible for processing asylum applications. However, if people do not apply for protection, they can be sent directly back to their country of origin or to a country with which the country of first reception also has an arrangement. The EU would financially support non-EU countries that would accept this form of arrangement and would deploy European agencies to these areas (Frontex and EUAA). To bring this project to fruition, the Danish Presidency proposes to use the New Pact for the Mediterranean as a basis for negotiations with non-EU countries.